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26 January 2007
[Federal Register: January 25, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 16)]
[Notices]
[Page 3395-3399]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr25ja07-35]
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; Report on
Residual Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination at Atomic Weapons
Employer Facilities and Beryllium Vendor Facilities
AGENCY: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) gives notice
as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005 (Pub. L. 108-375) of the release of a report on residual
contamination of facilities under the Energy Employees Occupational
Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPA), 42 U.S.C. 7384 et
seq. The report is below. The report and appendices are also available
at: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Larry Elliott, Director, Office of
Compensation Analysis and Support, National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, 4676 Columbia Parkway, MS C-46, Cincinnati, OH
45226, Telephone 513-533-6800 (this is not a toll-free number).
Information requests can also be submitted by e-mail to OCAS@CDC.GOV.
John Howard,
Director, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.
Report on Residual Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination at Atomic
Weapons Employer Facilities and Beryllium Vendor Facilities
Prepared by: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
John Howard, M.D., Director, December 2006
[[Page 3396]]
I. Summary of Results
This update to the Report on Residual Radioactive and Beryllium
Contamination at Atomic Weapons Employer Facilities and Beryllium
Vendor Facilities is the second revision of the original study reported
in November 2002 and revised in June 2004. The National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is required to submit this
report by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005
(NDAA) (Pub. L. 108-375), which amended the Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPA), 42
U.S.C. 7384 et seq., as follows:
1. For each facility for which such report found that insufficient
information was available to determine whether significant residual
contamination was present;
2. For each facility for which such report found that significant
residual contamination remained present as of the date of the report,
determine the date on which such contamination ceased to be present;
3. For each facility for which such report found that significant
residual contamination was present but for which the Director has been
unable to determine the extent to which such contamination is
attributable to atomic weapons-related activities, identify the
specific dates of coverage attributable to such activities and, in so
identifying, presume that such contamination is attributable to such
activities until there is evidence of decontamination of residual
contamination identified with atomic weapons-related activities;
4. For each facility for which such report found significant
residual contamination, determine whether it is at least as likely as
not that such contamination could have caused an employee who was
employed at such facility only during the residual contamination period
to contract a cancer or beryllium illness compensable under subtitle B
of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act
of 2000; and
5. If new information that pertains to the report has been made
available to the Director since that report was submitted, identify and
describe such information.
NIOSH found that there were 94 Atomic Weapons Employer (AWE) facilities
and 65 Beryllium Vendors that required evaluation as described above.
The documents reviewed did not indicate the existence of a current,
unrecognized occupational or public health threat. NIOSH evaluated new
information that had been identified since 2004. NIOSH also based
findings on information posted on the Department of Energy (DOE) Office
of Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) website as of July 31, 2006
(changes made to the DOE ES&H website after July 31, 2006 are not
reflected in this report).
The following actions have been taken in this report:
1. A determination on the presence of significant residual
radioactive or beryllium contamination has been made for all of the
facilities for which the previous report found that insufficient
information was available to determine whether significant residual
contamination was present.
2. A determination on the date when significant residual
contamination was no longer present has been made for many facilities
for which the previous report found that significant residual
contamination remained present as of the date of the report. However,
many sites were determined to have significant residual contamination
remaining as of the date of this report. This is described on a
facility-by-facility basis.
3. For all facilities for which the previous report was unable to
determine that significant residual contamination was attributable to
atomic weapons-related activities, specific dates of coverage
attributable to such activities have been determined and, when the
source of such contamination was not clear, the contamination was
presumed to be associated with atomic weapons-related activities.
4. All facilities for which significant residual contamination was
determined to be present after the period of weapons related production
are considered to have the potential of causing an employee who was
employed at such facility only during the residual contamination period
to contract a cancer or beryllium illness compensable under subtitle B
of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act
of 2000.
5. All information used in making the determinations in this report
are referenced in the individual facility evaluations found in
Appendices A-3 and B-3.
Individual results for the 94 AWEs evaluated as required by the
NDAA are as follows:
18 of the 94 atomic weapons employer facilities have
little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the
periods in which weapons-related production occurred.
72 of the 94 atomic weapons employer facilities have the
potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods
in which weapons-related production occurred.
4 of the 94 previously listed Atomic Weapons Employer
facilities are no longer listed as Atomic Weapons Employers on the DOE
ES&H Web site.
Individual results for the 65 Beryllium Vendor Facilities evaluated
are required by the NDAA are as follows:
7 of the 65 beryllium vendor facilities have little
potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods
in which weapons-related production occurred.
58 of the 65 beryllium vendor facilities evaluated have
the potential for significant residual contamination outside of the
periods in which weapons-related production occurred.
II. Background and Purpose
The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act
of 2000 (EEOICPA), 42 U.S.C. 7384 et seq., established a program to
compensate individuals who developed illnesses as a result of their
employment in nuclear weapons production-related activities at certain
facilities in which radioactive materials or beryllium was processed.
DOE was directed by Executive Order 13179 to publish in the Federal
Register a list of facilities covered by the Act. On January 17, 2001,
DOE published a list of AWEs, DOE facilities, and beryllium vendors, in
the Federal Register; the list was revised on December 27, 2002, 67 FR
32690. Updates to the list (corrections, additions, and deletions) have
been made periodically by DOE. This update to the Report on Residual
Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination at Atomic Weapons Employer
Facilities and Beryllium Vendor Facilities is the second revision to
the original study reported in November of 2002 and revised in June of
2004.
The DOE ES&H Web site (http://www.eh.doe.gov/advocacy) provides a
synopsis of the work performed at each facility, including a listing of
periods during which DOE believes, based on current information, that
weapons-related processing was conducted. In determining these periods,
DOE has applied the definitions in EEOICPA to the known facts about the
time and conditions of weapons-related processing at each facility. DOE
changes the entries on its database as additional information is
obtained. These periods are referred to in this report as ``Periods in
which weapons-related production occurred.'' It must be noted that the
Department of Labor (DOL) is responsible for determining actual periods
of covered employment based
[[Page 3397]]
upon DOE's findings as well as information from claimants and other
sources.
This study consisted primarily of an evaluation of documents
pertaining to AWEs. These include documents compiled by DOE ES&H,
documents obtained through NIOSH data capture efforts, and documents
located on the Formerly Utilized Sites Remediation Action Program
(FUSRAP) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Web sites. The quantity and
quality of the information available for each site varied
significantly. Examples of documentation reviewed include radiological
surveys, descriptions of production operations, contractual agreements,
and interoffice correspondence. In addition, interviews with current
and past employees of these facilities were conducted to obtain
information not contained in available documentation. When such
interviews were used in the facility evaluation, they are listed in the
individual site descriptions in Appendix B-3.
NIOSH believes that contamination levels at designated facilities
in excess of those indicated in 10 CFR part 835, Appendix D
(Occupational Radiation Protection, Surface Contamination Values)
indicate that there is ``significant contamination'' remaining in those
facilities. Documentation for each facility was reviewed, as available,
to determine if there was an indication that residual radioactive
contamination was present outside of the periods in which weapons-
related production occurred. Those levels then were compared to current
radiation protection limits as listed in 10 CFR part 835, to determine
if there was ``significant contamination.'' If there was no
documentation or limited documentation on radiation levels at specified
facilities, NIOSH made a professional judgment regarding the residual
contamination. If NIOSH determined there was ``the potential for
significant contamination'' at a designated facility, then NIOSH
determined, pursuant to NDAA, that such contamination ``could have
caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of a covered employee
with cancer.''
In the case of beryllium contamination, if there was no evidence
that the beryllium areas had been decontaminated, it was determined
that this material could have caused or substantially contributed to
the beryllium illness of an employee. Because beryllium sensitization
can occur at very low levels of exposure, the level of residual
beryllium contamination remaining was not included in the
determination.
Because the investigation involved evaluating potential radioactive
contamination and beryllium contamination, the study was divided so
that the required expertise could be devoted to the radiological
facilities and the beryllium facilities. Appendices A-1 and B-1 provide
synopses of the findings for the 159 facilities that were evaluated as
required by NDAA: Appendix A-1 applies to 94 facilities evaluated for
residual radioactive contamination while Appendix B-1 applies to 65
facilities evaluated for residual beryllium contamination.
Some of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred
have been changed on the DOE ES&H Web site since the June 2004 report.
Appendices A-2 and B-2 provide the current descriptions and evaluations
for all AWE and Beryllium Vendor facilities, respectively. Appendices
A-3 and B-3 provide descriptions of each facility, the data reviewed as
a part of this evaluation, and the final findings.
Periods of Residual Contamination
The evaluations focused on determining whether the potential for
significant residual contamination existed outside of the periods in
which weapons-related production occurred. In many cases, no records of
decontamination were found or surveys performed outside of the period
in which weapons-related production occurred indicated the existence of
significant residual contamination. However, some of the documentation
provided dates of decontamination, dates of demolition of the facility,
or descriptions of the radiological controls in place during
operations. For sites that exhibited a potential for significant
residual radioactive contamination outside of the periods in which
weapons-related production occurred, and for which an indication of a
more accurate period was available, this time period was provided. For
sites that exhibited a potential for significant residual radioactive
contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related
production occurred, and for which an indication of a more accurate
period was not available, it was assumed that significant residual
contamination existed until the time which the facility was demolished
or until the present, defined as July 2006, when this report was
written.
Some sites performed work with radioactive material and/or
beryllium for commercial purposes, in addition to work for the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC)/DOE. When it was impossible to distinguish
residual contamination resulting from AEC/DOE activities from those
resulting from commercial purposes, it was assumed that the
contamination was attributable to weapons-related activities.
III. Residual Radioactive Contamination Evaluation
This study consisted primarily of an evaluation of documents
pertaining to AWEs. These include documents compiled by DOE ES&H,
documents obtained through data capture efforts of NIOSH, and documents
located on the FUSRAP and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Web sites. In
all cases, the individual site finding is based on the available
information. The finding on any single site was based on the quantity
and completeness of the information available regarding that site and
professional judgment as necessary.
In this evaluation of residual radioactive contamination, as in the
previous report, the following factors were considered:
(1) The radionuclides involved;
(2) The quantity of radioactive material processed;
(3) The physical form of the radioactive material processed (i.e.,
solid, liquid, or gas);
(4) The operations performed and their potential for radiation/
radioactivity exposure;
(5) Documented radiological control and monitoring programs that
were in place during operations; and
(6) Documented decontamination of facilities
These factors were used to estimate the potential for radiation
exposure both during operations and after production/processing had
ceased. For example, a facility for which a decontamination survey was
documented was classified as having little potential for residual
radioactive contamination after the decontamination date, while a
facility with a high potential for residual radioactive contamination
during operations and no documented decontamination data was classified
as having a potential for residual contamination after operations had
ceased.
Each site was assigned to one of two categories:
1. Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for
significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-
related production occurred.
A site was assigned to this category if the documentation available
for the facility indicated one or more of the following
characteristics:
[[Page 3398]]
(a) The facility was decontaminated within the periods in which
weapons-related production occurred,
(b) The facility had very little potential for residual
contamination during actual operations, or
(c) The facility is still in operation and the end date is listed
as ``present.''
2. Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for
significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-
related production occurred.
A site was assigned to this category if there was documentation
indicating the following:
(a) Radioactive material was present in quantities or forms which
could have caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of a
covered employee, and
(b) Radioactive material was processed or present outside of the
dates as listed on the DOE ES&H website.
This type of documentation often included FUSRAP surveys conducted
after Manhattan Engineering District (MED)/AEC/DOE operations were
complete, which indicated the presence of residual radioactive
contamination that could be attributed to those activities.
In some cases, the facilities processed radioactive material for
not only nuclear weapons production, but also commercial, non-DOE
contracts. Sometimes the material processed for nuclear weapons
production was indistinguishable from material processed for commercial
purposes. Wherever residual radioactive contamination due to DOE
operations was not clearly distinguishable from that resulting from
commercial operations, it was assumed that the contamination was the
result of weapons production activities. As a result, in these cases,
the findings were that the potential for significant residual
contamination existed outside of the periods in which weapons-related
production occurred. For sites that exhibited a potential for
significant residual radioactive contamination outside of the periods
in which weapons-related production occurred, and for which an end date
could not be determined, it was assumed that significant residual
contamination existed until the time the facility was demolished or
until the present, defined as the date this report was written.
Findings of Evaluation of Facilities for Residual Radioactive
Contamination
The results of this study indicate that there are atomic weapons
employer facilities for which the potential for significant residual
radiological contamination exists outside of the periods in which
weapons-related production occurred as listed on the DOE ES&H website.
Appendix A-1 lists the findings for the potential for significant
residual radioactive contamination at the 94 facilities required for
evaluation by NDAA. Appendix A-2 lists all of the AWE facilities and
the findings for potential residual radioactive contamination. Appendix
A-3 describes each facility evaluated for residual radioactive
contamination, the data reviewed as a part of this evaluation, and the
final findings.
IV. Residual Beryllium Contamination Evaluation
The primary sources of information used to evaluate each site were
the individual facility files compiled by DOE ES&H. In addition,
interviews with current and past employees of these facilities were
conducted to obtain information not contained in available
documentation.
The finding on any single site was based on the quantity and
completeness of the information available regarding that site and
professional judgment as necessary.
In this evaluation of residual radioactive contamination, as in the
previous report, the following factors were considered:
(1) If beryllium was actually handled at the site.
(2) If there was evidence of decontamination of the facility.
These factors were used to estimate the potential for beryllium
exposure both during operations and after production/processing had
ceased. For example, a facility for which a decontamination survey was
documented or for which personal interviews indicated that
decontamination was performed, was classified as having little
potential for residual beryllium contamination after the
decontamination date; a facility without such evidence of
decontamination was classified as having a potential for residual
beryllium contamination after operations had ceased.
Each site was assigned to one of two categories:
1. Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for
significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-
related production occurred.
A site was assigned to this category if the documentation available
for the facility indicated one or more of the following
characteristics:
(a) Evidence of decontamination and/or beryllium contamination
survey data,
(b) The facility had very little potential for residual
contamination during actual operations, or
(c) The facility is still in operation and the end date is listed
as ``present.''
2. Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for
significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-
related production occurred.
A site was assigned to this category if either of the following
conditions existed:
(a) Documentation was available indicating that beryllium was
processed or present outside of the dates listed on the DOE ES&H
website that could have caused or substantially contributed to the
beryllium illness of a covered employee.
(b) There was no evidence of a decontamination of the facility or
area where beryllium was processed.
In some cases, the facilities processed beryllium material for not
only nuclear weapons production, but also commercial, non-DOE
contracts. Sometimes the material processed for nuclear weapons
production was indistinguishable from material processed for commercial
purposes. Wherever residual beryllium contamination due to DOE
operations was not clearly distinguishable from that resulting from
commercial operations, it was assumed that the contamination was the
result of weapons production activities. As a result, in these cases,
the findings were that the potential for significant residual
contamination existed outside of the periods in which weapons-related
production occurred. For sites that exhibited a potential for
significant residual beryllium contamination outside of the periods in
which weapons-related production occurred, and for which an end date
could not be determined, it was assumed that significant residual
contamination existed until the time the facility was demolished or
until the present, defined as the date this report was written.
Findings of Evaluation of Facilities for Residual Beryllium
Contamination
The results of this study indicate that there are Beryllium Vendor
facilities for which the potential for significant residual beryllium
contamination exists outside of the periods in which weapons-related
production occurred as listed on the DOE ES&H website.
Appendix B-1 lists the findings for the potential for significant
residual beryllium contamination at the 65 facilities required for
evaluation by NDAA. Appendix B-2 lists all Beryllium Vendor facilities
and the
[[Page 3399]]
findings for potential residual beryllium contamination. Appendix B-3
describes each facility evaluated for residual beryllium contamination,
the data reviewed as a part of this evaluation, and the final findings.
V. Conclusions
The findings of this study are: (1) Some atomic weapons employer
facilities and beryllium vendor facilities have the potential for
significant residual radiological and beryllium contamination outside
of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. (2) For
the purposes of this report, NIOSH believes that facilities having
``significant contamination'' had quantities of radioactive material
that ``could have caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of
a covered employee with cancer.'' (3) The documents reviewed did not
indicate the existence of a current, unrecognized occupational or
public health threat.
[FR Doc. E7-1157 Filed 1-24-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4163-19-P